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Sexual assaults have plagued the lives of millions of Americans 
each year, and college women are three times more likely to be victims 
of this crime.1  Reports of sexual assault often go unreported because 
the survivors fear a backlash from their perpetrators and from society.2 
Survivors also feel “ashamed to come forward” or fear that nothing 
will be done about it.3  Thankfully, this notion has started to subside as 
an effect of the #MeToo movement, which empowered women’s 
voices by standing in solidarity against sexual assault.4 
In 2006, a different story captivated the country’s attention as 
a Judge in North Carolina dismissed the infamous rape case of three 
Duke Lacrosse players after the allegations against them were shown 
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1 Courtney Smith-Kimble, The Realities of Sexual Assault on Campus, BEST 
COLLEGES, https://www.bestcolleges.com/resources/sexual-assault-on-campus/ (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
2 Cameron Kimble, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/sexual-assault-remains-dramatically-underreported. 
3 Id. 
4 See Understanding the Me Too Movement: A Sexual Harassment Awareness Guide, 
MARYVILLE UNIV., https://online.maryville.edu/blog/understanding-the-me-too-
movement-a-sexual-harassment-awareness-guide/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
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to be false.5  The typical gender-discrimination suit, often in the 
context of sports, involves a female victim against her school.6  
Recently, courts have seen an increase in cases where a male student 
claims that his school unfairly punished him for allegations of sexual 
assault because of his gender.7  These cases are typically referred to as 
“reverse” gender discrimination claims in which the plaintiff asserts a 
violation of Title IX.  Title IX provides that “[n]o person shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”8 
Despite all of the case law surrounding Title IX claims, there is 
an inconsistent application of pleading requirements for these claims 
to survive a motion to dismiss.  When reviewing a motion to dismiss, 
a court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint and draws all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.9  The Second Circuit 
applies a “minimal evidence” standard that affords the student a 
“temporary presumption” of discrimination,10 while the Sixth Circuit 
adheres to the plausibility standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly11 and affirmed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.12   
For clarification, “reverse” Title IX claims are analyzed in the 
same manner that any Title IX claim would be.  These claims are 
referred to as “reverse” gender-discrimination simply because a male 
student is asserting the claim rather than a female.  Additionally, for 
the purposes of this Note, all references are to Title IX as they apply to 
post-secondary educational institutions, and not as applied to K-12 
schools.  Finally, for the purposes of this Note, sexual misconduct 
refers to any sexual violence or harassment defined as  
 
 
5 Jen Yamato, The Stripper Who Cried ‘Rape’: Revisiting the Duke Lacrosse Case 
Ten Years Later, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-
stripper-who-cried-rape-revisiting-the-duke-lacrosse-case-ten-years-later. 
6 Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2021). 
7 Weiru Fang, Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and Subsequent Effect of ‘Anti-
Male Bias’ Claims in Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 
467, 468 (2019). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
9 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018). 
10 Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 53-56 (2d Cir. 2016). 
11 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
12 556 U.S. 662 (2008); Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 588. 
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unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature. Sexual violence is a form of 
sexual harassment. Sexual violence, as OCR uses the 
term, refers to physical sexual acts perpetrated against 
a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving 
consent. A number of different acts fall into the 
category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual 
assault, sexual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual 
coercion.13  
 
This Note will use the same definitions as provided by the U.S. 
Department of Education.  
Part I of this Note provides the introduction and procedural 
requirements mandated by Title IX.  Part II of this Note discusses the 
evolving pleading requirements established by the Supreme Court as 
well as the burden-shifting framework for Title VII claims established 
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,14 and its progeny.  Part III 
provides an overview of the Second Circuit’s and the Sixth Circuit’s 
conflicting standard for evaluating the sufficiency of a Title IX 
complaint upon review of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).15  Finally, Part IV will argue that the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals is misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent.  
Additionally, Part IV will explain why the plausibility standard is the 
best way to judge the sufficiency of a complaint, in the context of 
“reverse” Title IX claims.  Furthermore, this section will address the 
negative ramifications for both the school and the victims of sexual 
assault on college campuses that result from the Second’s Circuit’s 
lower pleading standards.  
A. Title IX Procedural Requirements 
Title IX requirements apply to any educational institution that 
receives federal funding.16  These requirements are not limited to 
 
13 OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Sex-based Harassment, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/pro-students/issues/sex-
issue01.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2021). 
14 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
16 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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public schools because almost every private school receives funding 
through federal financial aid programs used by their students.17  Title 
IX is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights, (OCR) which ensures 
that schools are complying with all the mandates.18   
Once a student asserts a claim of sexual assault or harassment 
and files a grievance to the school’s Title IX Coordinator, the school 
is required to investigate the claim to ensure a safe environment.19  
Schools use Title IX hearings to investigate the alleged misconduct and 
discipline a student if found guilty.20  Currently, schools are free to 
choose between using the preponderance of the evidence standard or 
the clear and convincing evidence standard for finding culpability.21  
There are standards in place that require that the administrative Title 
IX hearing be live and impartial.22  Additionally, the accused student 
must be allowed to cross-examine witnesses, challenge evidence, and 
submit evidence for his defense.23  Finally, both parties must be 
notified in writing of the school’s final decision and the rationale used 
to reach its decision.24  Title IX also mandates that a student has the 
opportunity to appeal any disciplinary decision.25 
In recent years, numerous schools have been defending federal 
lawsuits for unfairly punishing male students for sexual misconduct 
 
17 Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6. 
18 OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html. 
19 What You Need to Know About Title IX Hearings, LAW OFF. OF BRIAN JONES, 
LLC, https://thelawofficeofbrianjones.com/2019/02/20/what-you-need-to-know-
about-title-ix-hearings/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).  
20 Id.  
21 R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX rules on 
Sexual Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-the-department-of-educations-final-
title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct. 
22 U.S. Department of Education Launches New Title IX Resources for Students, 
Institutions as Historic New Rule Takes Effect, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Aug. 14, 2020), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-launches-new-
title-ix-resources-students-institutions-historic-new-rule-takes-effect.  These 
hearings must be conducted in real time, but may be done through video conferencing 
to protect the victims.  Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/ 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
25 Id. 
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without sufficient evidence.26  In this situation, the male student’s best 
recourse would be asserting a Title IX claim against his school by 
pleading an erroneous outcome of the administrative hearing due to the 
gender-based bias of the disciplinary panel.27  
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A. The Evolution of Pleading Requirements 
Shortly after the Civil Rights Movement began to gain traction 
in the United States, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case 
Brown v. Board of Education,28 where it held that segregation of 
students in public schools on the basis of “color” was a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and overturned the “separate but equal” 
doctrine.29  Five months later, the Supreme Court decided Conley v. 
Gibson,30 which involved a discrimination claim by railway employees 
against their union for firing black workers in order to replace them 
with their white counterparts.31  The workers’ complaint alleged the 
union fired or demoted forty-five African-Americans under the pretext 
that their jobs were eliminated, but the union did not actually eliminate 
those jobs and hired forty-five white workers to fill their “eliminated” 
positions.32  The union moved to dismiss the complaint for “fail[ure] 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”33  In its decision, 
the Supreme Court established the “notice” pleading standard by 
holding a complaint does not need to set forth detailed facts, but rather 
put the defendant on “fair notice” of the claim and the ”grounds on 
which it rests.”34   The Court noted that this lower standard would 
permit claims to move onto the discovery phase in order to “facilitate 
a proper decision [based] on the merits.”35  Additionally, the Court held 
 
26 Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-look-
federal-courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings.  
27 Id.  
28 347 U.S. 483 (1957). 
29 Id. at 495.   
30 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
31 Id. at 43.   
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 47. 
35 Id. at 48. 
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that a complaint is sufficient unless it is clearly evident that “no set of 
facts” would support the claim.36 
Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard was precedent until it 
was abrogated in 2007, when the Supreme Court decided Twombly.37  
Twombly involved a claim brought by a group of subscribers against 
telephone and internet service providers for violating § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.38   The complaint alleged that the telecommunication 
providers conspired with each other to eliminate competition by 
showing the providers’ parallel conduct of raising the price of their 
service, inferring these service providers had entered into a contract 
with each other to not compete by offering lower prices.39  The 
Supreme Court noted that the parallel conduct of the service providers, 
absent any factual context suggesting an agreement, was insufficient 
to establish an agreement between the service providers because it was 
a mere legal conclusion.40  “[W]e do not require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”41  The Court explained that the parallel 
behavior described in the complaint was likely the result of market 
forces.42 
The Supreme Court addressed the plausibility standard again 
two years later in Iqbal.43  This case involved a Muslim man who was 
arrested and detained in the United States on criminal charges in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.44  The man asserted 
a discrimination claim against federal officials, Robert Muller, former 
Director of the FBI, and John Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the 
United States.45  Specifically, the complaint alleged both Muller and 
Ashcroft “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 
subject’ respondent to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of 
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin 
 
36 Id. at 45-46. 
37 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). 
38 Id. at 550. 
39 Id. at 551-52. 
40 Id. at 564-65. 
41 Id. at 570. 
42 Id. at 568. 
43 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
44 Id. at 666. 
45 Id.  
6
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and for no legitimate penological interest.”46   The complaint further 
alleged that Ashcroft was the “‘principal architect’ of the policy” and 
that Muller was instrumental in adopting and implementing it.47  The 
Court applied a two prong test for establishing a sufficient pleading by 
removing legal conclusions from the complaint, and then determining 
if the remaining factual allegations supported a plausible inference of 
discriminatory purpose.48  The Court noted that the allegations in the 
complaint were simply a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a 
discrimination claim and were mere legal conclusions.49  The Court 
added that because the claims were legal conclusions, they were not 
entitled to the “presumption of truth.”50  After removing the legal 
conclusions from the complaint, the Court held that the pleading did 
not contain sufficient facts to plausibly allege discrimination by Muller 
and Ashcroft.51 
Iqbal affirmed that Twombly’s holding applied to all pleadings 
and was not limited to anti-trust claims. This plausibility standard was 
designed to protect defendants from meritless claims, where a plaintiff 
attempts only to find useful information during the expensive 
discovery process.52 
B. Burden-Shifting Framework of McDonnell and its 
Progeny 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green,53 and established the burden-shifting framework for a Title 
VII claim.54  Title VII is an anti-discrimination law that prohibits work-
place discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin,” and was recently expanded to include sexual orientation and 
gender identity.55   In McDonnell, a mechanic was laid off of work, 
after several years of employment, because of a reduction in the 
 
46 Id. at 669 (quoting First Am. Compl., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 
04–CV–1809)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 680. 
49 Id. at 681. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 687.  
52 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007). 
53 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
54 Id. at 802-04. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
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employer’s work force.56  The employee was an active member of the 
civil rights movement and thought his lay-off was racially motivated, 
so he arranged a public protest against the corporation.57  The 
mechanic participated in a protest that illegally obstructed traffic as 
well as a “lock in.”58  Three weeks after the protests, the corporation 
publicly advertised an opening for a qualified mechanic and the former 
employee applied for the position.59  The corporation denied the 
application based on the mechanic’s involvement in the protests.60  The 
mechanic filed a lawsuit asserting he was denied employment based 
on his race, which violated Title VII protection, and his participation 
in the protest.61 The corporation asserted that he was not re-hired based 
on his involvement in the unlawful protest and race was not a factor in 
its decision.62  The Court held that in Title VII claims, the plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case, then the 
burden shifts to the defendant to establish a non-discriminatory reason, 
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish the non-
discriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.63  Here, the 
case was remanded to the district court to allow the mechanic to 
demonstrate that the corporation’s reason for not re-hiring was a 
pretext for actual discrimination.64 
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A.,65 to address the issue “whether a complaint in an employment 
discrimination lawsuit must contain specific facts establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination under the framework” established in 
McDonnell.”66  Here, the Court unanimously held that a pleading did 
not need to “contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case” but 
rather “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”67  It is important to note that this case was decided under the 
 
56 McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 794. 
57 Id. at 794-95. 
58 Id. at 795 (“[A] ‘lock-in’ took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on 
the front door of a building to prevent the occupants . . . from leaving.”).  
59 Id. at 796. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 801.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 802-04. 
64 Id. at 806. 
65 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
66 Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. (8)(a)(2)). 
67 Id. 
8
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“no set of facts” pleading standard established in Conley and not the 
current plausibility standard.  In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court 
expressly noted that “[t]he prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, 
however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”68 
Looking forward, it is paramount to understand the evolution 
of pleading standards from Conley’s abrogated “no set of facts” 
standard to the current plausibility standard established in Twombly 
and Iqbal along with the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell.  
Part III will focus on the Second and Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent 
application of these standards in the context of Title IX claims at the 
12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss phase.  
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR TITLE IX 
CLAIMS 
This section will provide an analysis of both the Second and 
Sixth Circuits’ inconsistent interpretation of Swierkiewicz and the 
fundamentally different pleading standards that stem from the 
inconsistent holdings.  This section will also focus on how the two 
Circuits apply these different pleading standards to “reverse” Title IX 
gender-discrimination claims in separate, yet substantially similar 
situations, where a school unfairly punished a male student for alleged 
claims of sexual assault. 
A. The Second Circuit’s Minimal Evidence Standard 
Although “reverse” Title IX claims have gained attention in 
recent years, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed this 
concept in 1994, when deciding the sufficiency of a student’s 
complaint in Yusuf v. Vassar College.69  Here, a male student was 
“brutally attacked” by his roommate, and when the student filed 
criminal charges, the roommate’s girlfriend claimed that the student 
sexually harassed her on multiple occasions.70  The school found the 
student guilty of sexual harassment and suspended him for a year.71  
The student brought a Title IX action against his school on the ground 
 
68 Id. at 510. 
69 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). 
70 Id. at 712. 
71 Id. at 713. 
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that his school’s decision constituted gender discrimination.72  The 
Second Circuit noted that “Title IX bars the imposition of university 
discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to 
discipline.”73  The court separated gender discrimination claims into 
two categories, erroneous outcome and selective enforcement.74  An 
erroneous outcome claim involves an innocent student who was 
wrongfully punished for sexual misconduct.75 A selective enforcement 
claim asserts that, regardless of fault, the severity of the punishment 
was affected by the student’s gender.76 
At the time this case was decided, the court adhered to the 
abrogated “no set of facts” pleading standard established in Conley.77  
The complaint required a fairly low burden of proof and would have 
satisfied an erroneous outcome claim if it “allege[d] particular facts 
sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the 
outcome of the disciplinary proceeding” and a “causal connection 
between the flawed outcome and gender bias.”78  The school did not 
allow the student to introduce evidence that proved he was in the 
infirmary on the date of the alleged sexual harassment or call witnesses 
that showed the roommate’s girlfriend had an ulterior motive for 
claiming sexual harassment.79  The court ultimately held that the 
student’s complaint cast doubt on the outcome of the school’s 
proceeding.80  Additionally, the causal connection was satisfied 
because the school’s prosecution of males for sexual misconduct 
“’historically and systematically’ and ‘invariably found [males] guilty, 
regardless of evidence, or lack thereof.’”81 
The Second Circuit created the minimal evidence standard in 
2015, when it interpreted  Swierkiewicz in the Title VII case, Littlejohn 
v. City of New York.82  Here, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
deviated from the plausibility standard for pleadings, when it held that 
a Title VII complaint only required a “minimal inference of 
 
72 Id. at 714. 
73 Id. at 715.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 713.  
78 Id. at 715. 
79 Id. at 712-13. 
80 Id. at 715. 
81 Id. at 716.  
82 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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discriminatory motivation.”83  The court attempted to reconcile its 
decision with Iqbal, by noting the Supreme Court’s holding was 
broad.84  Additionally, the court explained that Iqbal did not apply to 
cases that fall under the McDonnell burden-shifting framework, and by 
further noting that a decision otherwise would be inconsistent with 
Swierkiewicz.85  The Second Circuit stated that “[t]o the same extent 
that the McDonnell Douglas temporary presumption reduces the facts 
a plaintiff would need to show to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment prior to the defendant’s furnishing of a non-discriminatory 
motivation, that presumption also reduces the facts needed to be 
pleaded under Iqbal.”86 
After the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Second Circuit 
decided to readdress the sufficiency of a complaint in Title IX claims 
in Doe v. Columbia University.87   This case involved a male student 
who was suspended from school for eighteen months after a school 
proceeding found him guilty of non-consensual sex with a female 
student.88  The male student adamantly claimed the encounter was 
consensual and sued the school for gender discrimination.89  The 
Second Circuit completely deviated from the “plausibility” standard 
established in Twombly and Iqbal when it held the male student’s 
complaint “plead[ ] sufficient specific facts giving at least the 
necessary minimal support to a plausible inference of sex 
discrimination to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”90 
In Columbia University, the Second Circuit justified the link 
between the Title VII analysis and the Title IX claim by noting how 
factually similar the claims are and how it has consistently interpreted 
Title IX claims with Title VII case law.91  Finally, the court added that 
it implicitly adopted the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell 
when it decided Yusuf and “made [it] clear that Title VII cases provide 
the proper framework for analyzing Title IX discrimination claims.”92 
 
83 Id. at 310. 
84 Id. at 309-10. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 310. 
87 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016). 
88 Id. at 52. 
89 Id. at 53.  
90 Id. at 56. 
91 Id. at 55. 
92 Id. at 55-56, 59. 
11
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The Second Circuit held that the male student sufficiently 
pleaded specific facts to plausibly show a minimal inference that the 
school acted with a “pro-female, anti-male bias” with respect to the 
student’s hearing, the school’s punishment, and their rejection of his 
appeal.93  There was evidence that the bias was endorsed by the school 
in response to allegations by students and the press that the school did 
not adequately investigate or punish male students for sexual assault.94  
Here, the school never sought any witness to corroborate the male 
student’s version of events that the female engaged in consensual sex 
with him.95  Additionally, there was no evidence introduced that the 
female was coerced and the school relied on her unsupported 
accusation.96  The court noted that when the evidence is clearly in favor 
of one side yet the school rules in favor of the other, without reason, it 
would be plausible to infer the decision was “influenced by bias.”97 
B. Sixth Circuit and the Iqbal Standard 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently applied the 
plausibility standard, established in Twombly and Iqbal, to pleading 
requirements without modification for Title IX claims.98  The Sixth 
Circuit expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s modified pleading 
standard of “minimal plausible inference.”99  The primary reason for 
the inconsistent application of pleading requirements is attributed to 
the two Circuits’ different interpretation of Swierkiewicz, which both 
Circuits still recognize as good law.100   
In Keys v. Humana, Inc.,101 the Sixth Circuit did not interpret 
Swierkiewicz as a pleading requirement but rather an evidentiary 
standard for a prima facie case.102  Here, an employee claimed a Title 
VII violation against her employer alleging termination based on 
 
93 Id. at 56.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 57. 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  The Second Circuit could have reached the same result under the plausibility 
standard of Iqbal and Twombly if the student pleaded an erroneous outcome theory 
of liability.  Infra, Section IV.B.⁋7.  
98 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Colum. Univ., 
831 F.3d at 56). 
99 Id. at 589. 
100 Id. 
101 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012). 
102 Id. at 609. 
12
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race.103  The employee appealed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
her Title VII claim.104  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately 
held that the employee’s complaint was plausible on its face, therefore, 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.105 
The Sixth Circuit explained that Twombly and Iqbal did not 
change Swierkiewicz’s holding because Swierkiewicz “‘did not change 
the law of pleading,’ but simply reemphasized that application of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at the pleading stage ‘was 
contrary to the Federal Rules’ structure of liberal pleading 
requirements.”106  The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff in a Title VII 
case must establish sufficient facts to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal to 
survive a motion to dismiss.107  Additionally, it is important to note 
that the Sixth Circuit recognizes that the Twombly and Iqbal standard 
is not to be interpreted “so narrowly as to be the death of notice 
pleading” but requires a plaintiff’s allegations to be plausible.108  
The Sixth Circuit readdressed pleading requirements for Title 
IX in Doe v. Miami University,109 which involved a Title IX claim by 
a male student who was suspended after his school found him guilty 
of sexually assaulting a female student.110  His complaint alleged 
erroneous outcome, among other theories of liability, and stated that 
he could not remember the events.111  Additionally, the female 
student’s written statement was inconsistent with her testimony at the 
administrative hearing.112  The Sixth Circuit found that the 
inconsistency coupled with the lack of explanation by the school 
regarding how they resolved the inconsistency, satisfied the first prong 
of casting “articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the 
disciplinary hearing.”113 
The male student also showed a “causal connection between 
the flawed outcome and gender bias” by presenting statistical evidence 
 
103 Id. at 608-09. 
104 Id. at 608; the claim involved both a Title VII claim and a violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981.   
105 Id. at 610. 
106 Id. at 609 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
107 Id. at 610. 
108 Id.  
109 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018). 
110 Id. at 584. 
111 Id. at 592. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
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which clearly showed a “pattern of gender-based decision-making.”114  
He alleged facts that showed every male student who was accused of 
sexual misconduct that year was found guilty.115  Additionally, the vast 
majority of students that were found guilty by the school, in the 
previous three years, had “male first-names.”116  Finally, his attorney 
submitted an affidavit that stated he “represent[ed] many students in 
Miami University’s disciplinary proceedings, [and] describe[d] a 
pattern of the University perusing investigations concerning male 
students, but not female students.”117  The court also noted that the 
school “faced external pressures” to vigorously adjudicate perpetrators 
of sexual misconduct by the federal government, specifically noting 
the “Dear Colleague Letter” and private lawsuits.118 
Here, the Sixth Circuit held that the male student sufficiently 
pleaded factual allegations that casted doubt on his adjudication 
proceeding and coupled with the external pressures the school faced, 
his complaint plausibly supported an inference of gender-bias 
decision-making.119 
IV. PROPOSAL TO FOLLOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
This section proposes that the best solution for these different 
approaches would be to follow the Sixth Circuit.  There is strong 
evidence that the Second Circuit’s key case to support its minimal 
evidence standard is based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court 
precedent. Furthermore, the plausibility standard is appropriate 
because any student who is wrongfully punished by his school would 
already have access to everything he needs to plausibly allege gender-
discrimination.  Finally, allowing a lower pleading standard would 
have harmful economic effects for the school and devastating mental 
health effects on the female victims of sexual misconduct.     
There is no doubt that there are cases where a public school 
unfairly adjudicated a male student on the basis of his gender.120  
Adhering to the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Twombly and 
 
114 Id. at 593. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (quoting Am. Compl., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 
1:15–CV–00605)). 
118 Id. at 594. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 584. 
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Iqbal does not bar a chance at recovery.121   In the Sixth Circuit, any 
individuals who believes they have been found guilty in a university 
disciplinary proceeding based on their gender has at least four different 
theories of liability available to them: selective enforcement, deliberate 
indifference, hostile environment, and erroneous outcome.122  It is 
important to remember that a student’s claim of gender discrimination 
will survive a motion to dismiss if the factual allegations assert “more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”123 
The first theory, selective enforcement, requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that an individual, of opposite gender, was in a 
circumstance sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s and was treated more 
favorably.124  The second theory, deliberate indifference, requires 
plaintiff to “demonstrate that an official of the institution who had 
authority to institute corrective measures had actual notice of and was 
deliberately indifferent to the misconduct”125  Additionally, for a 
student’s claim, plaintiff must also allege that the “harassment [was] 
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively 
bar[ed] the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”126  
The third theory of liability is hostile environment, where a “plaintiff 
must allege that his educational experience was ‘permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of the victim’s’  
educational environment.’”127 
The last theory, and by far the most successful theory of 
liability, is erroneous outcome.128  “To plead an erroneous-outcome 
 
121 Id.   
122 Id. at 589-90. 
123 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
124 Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 Fed. Appx. 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2003). 
125 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589 (quoting Mallory, 76 Fed. Appx. at 638). 
126 Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).  
127 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
21 (1993)). 
128 Id. at 593-94; see Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018).  The court 
held that a student successfully pleaded erroneous outcome because the school 
discredited all male testimony and exclusively credited female testimony.  Id.  The 
student also pleaded that external pressure on the school to quickly adjudicate Title 
IX claims led to his punishment, therefore, the student claim was plausible.  Id. at 
586-87.  Similarly, in Doe v. Oberlin College, 963 F.3d 580, 586-88 (6th Cir. 2020), 
the court held that a student sufficiently pleaded erroneous outcome because he 
pleaded facts that casted a grave doubt to the school’s decision as a matter of common 
sense because of clear procedural irregularities.  The Sixth Circuit’s erroneous 
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claim, a plaintiff must allege: ‘(1) facts sufficient to cast some 
articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceeding’ and (2) a ‘particularized . . . causal connection between 
the flawed outcome and gender bias.’”129 
Allowing a claim, that only shows minimal evidence of 
discrimination, to survive a motion to dismiss is inappropriate because 
a student would already have access to all of the information he would 
need to plausibly establish sex-based discrimination.  Furthermore, the 
potential ramification for allowing potentially meritless claims to 
proceed into discovery will have a negative effect on the school and 
the female victims.  This would defeat the purpose of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal that directed the courts “to act 
as gatekeepers and to take a hard look at the pleadings before opening 
the doors to expensive pretrial discovery.”130 
A. Second Circuit Misinterpreted Swierkiewicz 
Although drawing the analogy between Title IX and Title VII 
is logical because of the similar legislative intent of the statutes to 
protect against discrimination, the Second Circuit was incorrect when 
it held in Littlejohn, that McDonnell and Swierkiewicz lowered the 
pleading requirement for Title VII claims.  The Supreme Court in 
Swierkiewicz expressly noted that it had “never indicated that the 
requirements for establishing a prima facie case under [McDonnell] 
also apply to the pleading standards that plaintiffs must satisfy in order 
to survive a motion to dismiss.”131  The only explanation the Second 
Circuit gave for its interpretation was that Iqbal was broad and did not 
apply to all cases, and that a ruling otherwise would be contradictory 
to Swierkiewicz.132  A fundamental problem with the Second Circuit’s 
logic is that the Supreme Court expressly addressed this scenario in the 
lengthy opinion of Twombly which is typically read with Iqbal.133  The 
Supreme Court cleared up any possible confusion by reiterating that 
 
outcome theory of liability was taken from the Second Circuit’s decision in Yusuf, 
which the Second Circuit abandoned after adopting the burden-shifting framework 
of McDonnell.  Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589. 
129 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592 (quoting Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. Appx. 437, 
452 (6th Cir. 2016)).  
130 Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 116 (2012). 
131 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).  
132 Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2015).  
133 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007).  
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the Second Circuit’s decision in Swierkiewicz was reversed because 
the court had “impermissibly applied what amounted to be a 
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege 
‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim.”134  The 
Supreme Court’s language is explicitly clear when it noted that its 
holding in Twombly does “not require heightened fact pleadings of 
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is 
plausible on its face.”135   
The Second Circuit is clearly following its own interpretation 
and logic that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court.  Furthermore, 
the Second Circuit’s ability to justify its rationale on lowering the 
pleading standard in Title IX claims is dependent on Littlejohn, which 
is fundamentally inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
B. Discovery is Not Required to Establish Plausibility 
Supporters of the Second Circuit’s decision argue the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell is appropriate in Title IX 
cases because it allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss at the 
initial phase on the case, therefore, allowing him access to discovery 
materials to prove gender discrimination.136  However, if a student 
pleads erroneous outcome, he will already have access to all the 
information required to establish the claim, without discovery.  
Remember, an erroneous outcome complaint has two prongs.137  The 
student must allege facts that “cast some articulable doubt on the 
accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding” and show a 
“causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender bias.”138 
In Doe v. Miami University, the student pleaded facts that 
discredited his disciplinary proceeding by referencing his own 
testimony, witness statements, and the written decision from the 
hearing, thus satisfying the first prong.139  Title IX mandates that 
schools provide an accused student with written notice of the 
complaint and its final decision after the hearing, which must contain 
the school’s rationale for its decision, as well as a chance to review all 
 
134 Id. at 570 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514). 
135 Id.  
136 Fang, supra note 7, at 487-88.  
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of the relevant evidence during his proceeding and an opportunity to 
appeal its decision.140  If the school complies with these Title IX 
mandates then the accused student already has access to all the relevant 
information needed to cast doubt on his proceeding.  It is extremely 
doubtful that a school would withhold these documents and blatantly 
violate the mandates of Title IX because non-compliance would risk 
the loss of federal funding.141  If the school did withhold these 
documents, it would be clear evidence of procedural irregularities.  The 
Sixth Circuit has noted that procedural irregularities during the 
adjudication hearing, such as a lack of notice to the involved parties, 
unexplained or uncommunicated delays in adjudication, or a lack of 
impartial treatment, would constitute strong evidence of gender bias.142  
The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, when it held that 
procedural irregularities in the adjudication process sufficiently 
implied gender bias.143  If a student was unfairly adjudicated by his 
school, he could plausibly cast doubt on his proceeding without 
advancing into discovery regardless of his school’s compliance with 
Title IX mandates.  
The second prong is also within the student’s ability, by 
showing a causal connection between the school’s flawed outcome and 
gender bias.  A student can plausibly allege that the school faced 
external pressure to quickly adjudicate sexual crimes or risk losing 
federal funding, with the “Dear Colleague Letter” and the surrounding 
circumstances.144  Additionally, he could compile statistical evidence 
that showed a pattern of finding males guilty of sexual offenses. Taken 
together, courts can plausibly infer the causal connection with the 
flawed outcome and gender bias.145  
In 2011, under the Obama administration, the United States 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) released the 
“Dear Colleague Letter” which provided troubling statistics published 
by the National Institute of Justice, such as, one in five women are 
 
140 U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., TITLE IX FINAL RULE OVERVIEW, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 2-
3, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-overview.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2020).  
141 Title IX, supra note 24. 
142 Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020).  
143 Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 37 (2d Cir. 2019).   
144 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d at 587; Doe v. Baum, 903 
F.3d 575, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2018). 
145 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592; Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d at 587. 
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sexually assaulted while in college.146  OCR’s letter instructed schools 
that receive federal funding, to investigate and adjudicate sexual 
assault claims by using the preponderance of evidence standard and 
advised that a typical investigation takes approximately sixty days.147  
The letter also outlined that failure to comply with its guidelines would 
result in the loss of federal funding for the violating school.148 
In 2017, under the Trump administration, the OCR rescinded 
the “Dear Colleague Letter.”149  The rescission letter asserted that the 
2011 letter “[placed] improper pressure upon universities to adopt 
procedures’. . . for resolving allegations that ‘lack[ed] the most basic 
elements of fairness [for the accused.]’”150  Additionally, OCR no 
longer required schools to use the preponderance of the evidence 
standard but allowed them to decide the acceptable standard to use.151  
Despite the Trump Administration’s rescission of the “Dear Colleague 
Letter,” courts are still citing to its effects of pressure on schools to 
vigorously combat sexual assault or risk losing federal funds.152  
Moving forward, President Joe Biden has vowed to reverse the Trump 
Administration’s rules regarding sexual assault investigations, which 
will only strengthen the argument for external pressure.153 
Additionally, a student would already have access to the 
school’s sexual-crime statistics pursuant to the Clery Act.154  This 
federal statute mandates that any school that receives federal funding 
must collect, publish, and disseminate statistics for the past three years 
regarding every sexual offense reported to campus security or law 
enforcement.155  Although the Clery Act does not require schools to 
disclose identifiable information, a student can request the final 
decision of any disciplinary proceedings where a student was found 
 
146 See OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights, Russlynn Ali, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.  
147 Id. at 11-12. 
148 Id. at 16. 
149 OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Sept. 22, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.   
150 Id. at 2-3. 
151 Id.  
152 Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020). 
153 Erica L. Green, Biden’s Education Department Will Move Fast to Reverse Betsy 
DeVos’s Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/politics/biden-education-devos.html.  
154 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i)(II). 
155 Id.  
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guilty of a sex offense, without consent of the perpetrator.156  This final 
decision must reveal the perpetrator’s name, violation committed, 
sanction, and any evidence that supports the sanction.157  This 
information can be used to create the statistical evidence referenced in 
Doe v. Miami University.158  Finally, in the age of social media, it 
would also be easy to access any public criticism of the school for not 
perusing sexual assault allegations with a simple Google search, which 
has been a factor in determining the causal connection.159  If a school 
is engaged in gender-based decision making with regard to disciplinary 
proceedings, any victim of reverse gender-discrimination has access to 
enough facts to plausibly support his claim without access to 
discovery. 
The Second Circuit could have achieved the same result if it 
required the Iqbal pleading standard of plausibility.  In Doe v. 
Columbia University, the student essentially pleaded erroneous 
outcome by alleging facts that show the clear procedural irregularities 
during his administrative hearing, thus, satisfying the first prong.160  
He also alleged facts that show the causal connection between his 
flawed outcome and gender-bias by stating the school was combating 
public criticism from the press for ignoring females’ complaints of 
sexual assault in the past.161  These facts coupled with the external 
pressures from the government to combat sexual assault would clearly 
satisfy the second prong, and allow the student to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  In this case, all the facts the student pleaded were already in 
his possession or easily accessible through means outside of the 
discovery process. 
 
156 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(14) (2020).  This statute is an exception to the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which prohibits a school from 
disclosing a student’s disciplinary records without the student’s consent.  Id.; 
Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities.  U.S. DEP’T OF ED., (Oct. 
2007), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/postsec.html.  
157 34 C.F.R. § 99.39 (2020).  
158 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018). 
159 Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). 
160 Id. at 56. 
161 Id. 
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C. Ramifications of a Lower Pleading Requirement 
Upon first impression, it would be reasonable to think the 
Second Circuit’s burden-shifting framework is harmless because once 
the initial “minimal evidence” burden is met and the school states a 
non-discriminatory reason for the disciplinary action, the student’s 
presumption of discrimination disappears.162  The effects of the Second 
Circuit’s decision will lead to increased settlements due to the tangible 
and intangible cost of litigation as well as negatively impacting the 
mental health of the victimized women. 
Once the student’s minimal evidence is met and survives a 
motion to dismiss, discovery will ensue.  Schools must “allocate 
precious time, energy, and resources to meet the new federal 
guidelines” when handling Title IX claims and now have to pay for the 
cost of a potentially meritless lawsuit.163  This undoubtedly takes away 
from the time, resources, and support that should go to the victim of a 
campus sexual assault.  It is no secret that when a claim is allowed to 
survive a motion to dismiss and proceed into discovery, there is higher 
litigation expense and chance of settlement.  Discovery expenses 
typically comprise half of the litigation expense.164 
In addition to the monetary cost of proceeding with the case, 
such litigation would involve a significant amount of negative 
publicity.165  In 2016, the University of Tennessee settled a Title IX 
case for $2.48 million dollars.166  Raja Jubran, University of Tennessee 
Board Vice Chairman, said with regard to the settlement, “[o]ne side 
ultimately would have won in court several years from now, and we 
felt confident about our legal position, but I truly believe that both sides 
would have lost.”167  She went on to add, “[t]he intangible costs of 
emotional stress to those involved and the distraction to all of our 
 
162 Id. at 54. 
163 Greta Anderson, New Requirements, More Costs, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 10, 
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/10/community-colleges-
burdened-new-title-ix-regulations.  
164 Bethany A Corbin, Riding The Wave Or Drowning?: An Analysis Of Gender Bias 
And Twombly/Iqbal In Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2665, 2711 (2017). 
165 Anita Wadhwani, Settling Sex Assault Lawsuits Cost Universities Millions, 
TENNESSEAN (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/07/06/settling-sex-assault-lawsuits-
costs-universities-millions/86756078/.  
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
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positive progress at UT, over and above the actual legal cost, would 
have been exorbitant.”168  It is clear that there is a strong desire to avoid 
litigation. This desire inevitably coerces schools to settle Title IX 
claims quickly and quietly outside of the courtroom.  
Sexual assaults on college campuses have risen in the past few 
years.169  The Association of American Universities (AAU) announced 
that its 2019 survey of over 181,752 students revealed a thirteen 
percent increase of sexual assaults from its 2015 survey.170  
Additionally, women are disproportionately affected compared to their 
male counterparts.171  According to the Justice Department’s report of 
sexual assault on school campuses, roughly eighty percent of sexual 
assaults go unreported.172  The Center for Public Integrity conducted a 
yearlong investigation on sexual assaults on college campuses and 
found that “students deemed ‘responsible’ for alleged sexual assaults . 
. . can face little or no consequence for their acts.”173  Underreporting 
coupled with a higher rate of perpetrators settling with schools for 
gender-discrimination will have a serious impact on victimized 
women’s mental health because the victims will see their perpetrator’s 
punishment lifted for the sole reason of avoiding litigation.174 
There is no doubt that women who have been sexually 
assaulted suffer from a range of trauma, such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), eating disorders, substance abuse problems, anxiety, 
depression and other serious social and emotional problems.175  When 
the perpetrators go unpunished, it sends a strong message to victimized 
 
168 Id.  
169 Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Misconduct, 




170 Id. at 7. 
171 Id.  
172 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248471, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION 
AMONG COLLEGE-AGE-FEMALES, 1995-2013 (2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf. 
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Andrew Van Dam, Less Than 1% Of Rapes Lead To Felony Convictions. At Least 
89% Of Victims Face Emotional And Physical Consequences, WASH. POST. (Oct. 6, 
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women that they were not believed when they came forward which 
tends to lead to “secondary victimization.”176  The lower pleading 
standard will inevitably lead to more cases settling, resulting in more 
perpetrators staying in school with their victims, and causing more 
harm to the victims.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Although “reverse” gender discrimination claims are not a new 
phenomenon, they have clearly increased in recent years.  The current 
Circuit split is an important issue and is ripe for the Supreme Court to 
address and establish the proper pleading requirements for Title IX 
claims.  By no means does this Note seek to jeopardize the avenue of 
recourse of an alleged victim of “reverse” gender discrimination, but a 
clear and uniform standard should be applied to these federal claims.  
The Second Circuit relies on Littlejohn, to support its “minimal 
evidence” standard but its holding expressly conflicts with Supreme 
Court precedent.  Additionally, there is no necessity for courts to allow 
a lower pleading requirement because a student already has access to 
all the facts he would need to plausibly assert his claim of gender 
discrimination.  Finally, allowing a lower pleading standard for 
“reverse” Title IX claims will have serious ramifications for the school 
and the victims of sexual misconduct.  In the interest of justice, this 
Note offers guidance on why the Second Circuit’s minimal evidence 
standard should be abandoned and why the Sixth Circuit’s pleading 
standard should be adopted. 
 
176 See Top Ten Things Advocates Need To Know, UNIV. OF KY.  CTR. FOR RES. ON 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Dec. 2011), 
https://opsvaw.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/07_Rape_Prosecution.pdf. 
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